Have rapid technological progresss revolutionized the behavior of war? What other changes in our internal togss [ organisation, philosophy, and force constructions ] must attach to technological discoveries? Does engineering necessitate a reformulated conceptual alteration in war-making?
War and the act of war-making has been the topic of research and intense discourse amongst military faculty members. Clausewitz viewed war as belonging “ non to the state of humanistic disciplines and scientific disciplines, but to the state of societal life… . State policy is the uterus in which war is developed, in which its lineations lie hidden in a fundamental province, like the qualities of life animals in their sources. ”[ 1 ]
Such an apprehension of the nature of war is utile as it implies that a holistic analysis of the development of war and warfare encompasses non merely Political, Economic, Social and Technological ( PEST ) social factors, but in add-on, it must see constructs of war ( schemes, philosophy and tactics ) , every bit good as organisation, force constructions, security context and the influence of people.
This essay specifically examines the technological dimension of war and the impact engineering has on the behavior of war. Like Van Creveld ‘s averment that “ if it is true that every portion of war is touched by engineering, it is no less true that every portion of engineering affects war, ”[ 2 ]I will get down this essay by following how evolutionary alterations in engineering have affected warfare. I will so exemplify how engineering impacts strategic, operational and tactical degrees. I will so travel on to exemplify why internal togss such as force construction, organisation and philosophies must concomitantly be altered with technological discoveries through the ways-means-ends statement. I will so exemplify why a reformulation of constructs in war-making is necessary to accomplish true synergism for triumph in the battleground. Jointly, the statements put forth will be that engineering has basically altered warfare, its impact cuts across all degrees of war, it induces attach toing changes to internal togss and it requires reformulated conceptual alterations in warfare. These statements will so take to the decision that engineering has so been a cardinal enabler in revolutionising[ 3 ]the behavior of war.
Impact of technological progresss to war and warfare
“ During the agricultural age, the lone cardinal alterations that occurred in the behavior of war were the consequences of societal and political factors instead than technological innovationaˆ¦.A systematic alteration in the behavior, if non in the nature of war was brought about during the nineteenth century by the proficient transmutations of the industrial age. ”[ 4 ]
Technological promotions have impacted war throughout history. The engineerings that have brought about important alterations to war and warfare are non limited merely to weaponry, but besides include apparently non-military engineerings such as vehicles ( for illustration, railroads ) , roads and communications, which Creveld describes as the “ substructure of war ”[ 5 ].
Through a chronological attack, I will exemplify that technological promotions have significantly altered the behavior of war. Before I do so, it is necessary to sketch some cardinal observations: 1 ) that the bulk of technological alterations in arms and arm systems had an impact non on strategic degrees of war, but on operational philosophies and tactics, 2 ) that rapid technological promotions have merely occurred since the Industrial Age, 3 ) that engineering promotions undergo an evolutionary rhythm of invention, taking to the engineering of each epoch edifice on those of the old epoch, and that 4 ) alterations to warfare frequently emerged from the interactive employment of a combination of technological progresss.
2000 B.C to 1500 A.D – The Age of Tools[ 6 ]. Technological progresss in this epoch focused on the human hunt for better personal arms and organic energy beginnings such as Equus caballuss, which besides limited the impact to the tactical degree of warfare. Of significance in this epoch was the innovation of the chariot in 1800 B.C, which provided huge betterment in tactical mobility over the ox-cart. This age besides saw the outgrowth of the horse between 500 and 1000 A.D, fuelled by the technological innovations of the high saddle, stirrup and the horseshoe. In add-on, the innovation of tactical communicating agencies, both acoustic devices such as horns, huntsman’s horns, bugles and cymbals to complement ocular signals gave the commanding officers of the Chinese and Roman ground forcess in the field, tactical flexibleness. At sea, technological innovations of naval ships with skeletal buildings both for transit and motion of logistics supplies occurred in 1300 A.D, significantly changing tactics of naval conflicts.
1500 to 1830 A.D- The Age of Machines[ 7 ]. This epoch saw a displacement in accent to machines utilizing inorganic energy beginnings. The ‘gunpowder revolution ‘ saw the coming of pieces and heavy weapon, with impact mostly at the tactical degree of war. Improved projecting techniques greatly improved heavy weapon as an violative arm, with heavy weapon transcending the musket in footings of effectual scope by a factor of 5 or 6. The increased scope allowed commanding officers such as Napolean to use guns across the battleground, making holes in enemy ranks, to be exploited first by foot columns, so by horse. At sea, a series of evolutionary technological promotions in the countries of ship development led to increased fitness and endurance of full-rigged ships.
1830 to 1945 A.D -The Age of Systems[ 8 ]. Besides known as the Industrial Age, this epoch was most important in that it saw the coming of a broad scope of technological promotions that revolutionized warfare in the Napoleonic wars and two universe wars. Industrialization enabled mass production capablenesss and nation-wide institutionalised invention, fuelling rapid technological promotions that saw wars in graduated tables unprecedented and the integrating of separate machines of the old epoch into complex systems. The coming of railroads and the telegraph transformed the scheme of war beyond concentration of force to the distribution and coordination of one ‘s resources between foreparts. The development of the percussion cap, breech-loading mechanisms and machine guns increased the volume, scope and truth of arms. The combined impact of the alterations in volume, scope and truth of arms facilitated alterations in war-fighting constructs at all degrees in countries such as scattering and intrenchment of forces. By the terminal of WW1, technological progresss saw the debut of the flamethrower, the submachine gun and heavy weapon pieces light plenty to be used in direct support of land military personnels, taking to the development of infiltration tactics by the Germans. The epoch besides saw the debut of the armored combat vehicle, which when combined with the 2-way wireless, led to operational and tactical mobility in warfare. Air power non merely extended the battleground itself to conflict infinite, but made it possible to assail strategic elements. At sea, technological discoveries in steam-power engine for ships and the coming of pigboats at operational degree and the debut of aircraft bearers with strategic force projection capablenesss likewise revolutionized naval warfare. In add-on, the inter-war old ages saw a important addition in communications and detector capableness with radio detection and ranging, echo sounder and electronics enabling aerial exposure reconnaissance by the British and Americans.[ 9 ]
1945 to 1990 A.D – The Age of Automation[ 10 ]. The Nuclear Revolution introduced the possibility of complete devastation of a province, stand foring a cardinal alteration in the character of warfare. Strategic Research and Developments weaponries such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or DARPA, accelerated focussed technological promotions to enable pictured operating constructs, taking to more capable, multi-role military platforms. Convergence of emergent engineerings led to the coming of transistors, which permitted extraordinary computer science capacity and velocities coupled with decrease in size, with matching applications across all degrees of warfare. Some illustrations of the development of the transistor include the SM-64 Navaho sail missile used in the mid-to-late 1950s and the mach-2 capable B-58, which was introduced in 1957. Advanced Command and Control ( C2 ) systems enhanced battlespace consciousness and introduced the development of near real-time information, detector merger and multi-systems integrating. The apogee of technological progresss that led to new capablenesss was competently demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm.
Other factors that impact warfare – Political, Economic and Social ( PES ) factors
Although the predating subdivision illustrated the impact evolutionary alterations in engineering and matching development of constructs to work these engineerings have had on altering the behavior of war, it is of import at this occasion to clear up that these factors do non be in a vacuity and alternatively be in a larger political, socio-cultural and economic context. Clausewitz ‘s three of ‘Government ‘ , ‘Military ‘ and ‘People ‘ articulates the being of these contextual factors. In following the development of engineering and warfare, it is of import to acknowledge engineering has been a cardinal enabler in re-shaping the behavior of war whilst bing in this larger context. Napoleon ‘s levee en masse that introduced lasting military constructions in the Agricultural age, every bit good as the reinforced political will, societal concepts and industrialisation in the Industrial age, are some illustrations of factors other than engineering, that have synergistically driven alterations to warfare along with engineering.
Technology spans strategic, operational and tactical degrees
Another feature of engineering that supports the averment of its important impact to warfare is its ability to cross and act upon across strategic, operational and tactical degrees. The typical rhythm involves engineering discoveries being contextualized and fielded at strategic degrees ; following a series of invention rhythms, this will finally cascade down to the operational and tactical degrees. An illustration is the aircraft, which began as strategic bombers but today, is employed in a assortment of functions such as work stoppage, air interdiction and to stop at operational-strategic degrees and even at tactical degree for missions such as close air support for land military personnels. Technology today has influence across all degrees of war with the selective development of its features and applications offering solutions to military commanding officers to enable laterality of the air, sea, land and infinite spheres of the conflict infinite, irrespective of terrain or environmental restraints.
Technology impacts strategic degree. The birth of military scheme occurred in the Napoleonic epoch where the harnessing of the full state ‘s resources for his runs led to graduated tables of wars antecedently non seen. Since so, engineering has continued to act upon at strategic degree. A outstanding illustration of engineerings that have for good altered military schemes is atomic capableness stemming from the atomic bomb. Case in point is the cautious mode in which the U.S trades with ‘rogue ‘ provinces like North Korea and Iran, despite possessing unmistakable conventional military might, in order to minimise the possible harm these provinces can bring down upon thickly settled through their atomic capablenesss. Another illustration would be the efficaciousness of air power today to singlehandedly impact the military run at strategic degree through the interactive development of capablenesss such as velocity, range and preciseness stemming from a combination of technological progresss in the Fieldss of propulsion, constructions, electronics, detectors and communications engineerings. For illustration, the capablenesss originating from the combination of engineering progresss in electronics, detectors and imaging engineerings today have enabled intelligence assemblage of strategic marks such as cardinal installings and substructure, enabling the run at strategic degree to be planned more robustly based on near real-time information.
Technology impacts operational degree. Technology is a cardinal factor that shapes operational design and programs by supplying a military commanding officer with the operational flexibleness to plan and be after missions that maximize strengths whilst minimising failings of specific engineerings. Operational philosophies and programs need to maintain gait with technological promotions for effectual public-service corporation in a specific runing context. Technological promotions, when translated to capablenesss, provide commanding officers with more options in operational design and planning in achieving military operational aims. For illustration, an operational commanding officer today can efficaciously do alterations to his operational mission programs, orchestrate and swing his military assets near real-time in response to operational developments, owing to progresss in C2 systems, informations nexus, detectors, imaging and network-centric engineerings that provides him with enhanced battlespace consciousness and intelligence assemblage capablenesss.
Technology impacts tactical degree. Tactics is the “ scientific discipline and art of using military personnels, ships or aircraft and associated arms in a front line or at immediate combat degree. This covers readying, ordered agreement and tactic in relation to each other and/or excessively the enemy in order to use their full potency in get the better ofing the enemy. ”[ 11 ]The advantages engineering offers are most obvious at tactical degree chiefly as engineering sets the boundary or limitation to what can or can non be done in the battleground. As seen through the legion illustrations cited earlier, engineering offers the advantages of increased scope, firepower, mobility, preciseness, situational consciousness and provides flexibleness at the tactical degree in footings of temperament of forces and line formations. An illustration is the progressive development from hackbut, to musket to flintlock to bayonet, which finally rendered pikemen disused and introduced new tactical formations for land military personnels. A more recent illustration of development of engineering at tactical degree is the extended usage of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, or UCAVs, such as the USAF Predator and RAF Reaper to non merely supply enhanced situational consciousness of terrain and enemy temperament but besides take on tactical battle functions of marks in the counter-terrorism contexts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Technology has altered the character and behavior of war
The predating paragraphs illustrated that 1 ) evolutionary alterations in engineering through clip has significantly altered the behavior of war and 2 ) the influence of engineering spans across strategic, operational and tactical degrees. The cardinal driver for this change in character and behavior of war has been the interactive effects of technological promotions and the development of military idea in deducing constructs to work these engineerings, and these exist within a larger political-social-economic concept that has besides facilitated and fuelled these developments. To add to the complexness of this statement, it is besides notable that the impact of engineering on war is non entire ; war in itself is a conflict of volitions as argued by Clausewitz, and as a human enterprise, Van Creveld argues that there are parts imperviable to engineering such as irrational factors of bravery and declaration, its maps of “ dramatic, protecting, traveling, repairing or keeping the enemy, intelligence assemblage, pass oning, providing, ” and the logic of struggle.[ 12 ]Hence, engineering, as a scientific discipline amidst the art of war, can non wholly change the behavior of war, but to the extent that it has contributed significantly to the manner in which wars are fought today, its impact to the behavior of war has been important.
Military version of technological discoveries
Utterback defines technological discoveries to be a consequence of discontinuous or extremist inventions in engineerings.[ 13 ]In order to asseverate that technological discoveries require attendant changes to internal togss such as organisation, philosophies and force constructions, it is first necessary to understand the military version procedure for engineering. Beyerchen outlined that technological alterations or progresss emerge from the interaction of a proficient alteration ( a alteration of physical equipment ) and an operational alteration ( new maps or processs for corporate employment ) with each other and with the environment.[ 14 ]In other words, for effectual employment, a technological discovery must undergo a military version rhythm that encompasses systems and processs to be developed such that the interaction of these processs and proficient alterations result in a new context emerging.
Technology and the military organisation
A military organisation is a “ unequivocal construction of a military component prescribed by a component authorization ; frequently composed of two or more units. ”[ 15 ]The military organisation is a bureaucratic, hierarchal organisation that has clearly defined constructions and procedures. Whilst such centralised constructions facilitate bid and control by supplying integrity of bid and mechanisms for the interlingual rendition of commanding officer ‘s purpose down to tactical degrees, they may non be optimized or nimble to encompass new engineerings. Technological discovery, particularly those that root from the civilian sector, can non ‘plug-and-play ‘ and be to the full adapted to the military context, without matching changes to military organisational constructions. An illustration to exemplify these thoughts is the recent organisational transmutation of the Republic of Singapore Air Force into its operational bids. The old type-focused organisational construction was sub-optimal in to the full working new capablenesss stemming from technological discoveries. Organizational transmutation was necessary in readying for the emerging remote-controlled fleet, new aircraft, armored combat vehicle and pigboats fuelled by a combination of technological discoveries.
Technology and Doctrines
Doctrines are defined as the “ cardinal rules by which military forces or elements thereof
steer their action in support of national aims[ 16 ]. Doctrines articulate the “ operational alteration ” that Beyerchen alluded to in the military version rhythm of technological discoveries. The failure to develop new philosophies in response to technological discoveries can turn out decisive in the success or failure of a run. The success of the British in the Battle of Britain in World War 2 is possibly an exemplifying illustration of this. Although the Germans held the proficient border in radio detection and ranging equipment through their institutional invention attempts in the inter-war old ages, it was the British enterprise to interpret their radio detection and ranging proficient promotions fleetly into operational defensive philosophies that proved decisive. As Churchill articulated in his memoir of World War 2, “ The Germans would non hold been surprised to hear our radio detection and ranging ulses for they had developed a technically efficient radio detection and ranging system which was in some respects in front of our ain. What would hold surprised them, nevertheless, was the extent to which we had turned our finds to practical consequence, and woven all into our general air defense mechanism system. In this, we led the universe, and it was operational efficiency instead than freshness of equipment that was the British accomplishment. ”[ 17 ]
Technology and Force construction
Force construction refers to the “ figure, size and composing of units that comprise a defense mechanism force. e.g. divisions, ships or air wings. ”[ 18 ]Force constructions are a manifestation of military philosophies and construct of operations, as they represent the man-machine composing that best suits how the military forces intend to contend. Following this statement, if philosophies need to be altered in response to technological discoveries, force constructions must besides correspondingly be altered. As an illustration, the inability of the British in World War 1 to postulate with the German usage of machine guns was due to the steadfast attachment to field tactics that involved directing military personnels for an foot charge into the direct line of machine gun fire. Having suffered heavy casualties, the British so altered their force construction to gripe up their machine gun composing within their battalions in acknowledgment of its importance in undertaking the German onslaught.
Technology and constructs – Ways, Means and Ends
“ The instruments of conflict are valuable merely if one knows how to utilize them. ”
Charles denim Jacque Joseph Ardant du Picq ( 19 October 1819 – 15 August 1870 )
Having illustrated the relationship between technological discoveries and internal togss and established a instance for their corresponding changes in response to engineerings, allow me now move on to the relationship between engineering and constructs. Military constructs, consisting scheme, philosophies and tactics, are chiefly descriptions of how things are done.[ 19 ]Concepts, frequently embodied in the run program, “ loosely outline the overall image of an operation, including its premises, purpose and describes in sufficient item how to contend and carry through a mission. ”[ 20 ]The statement above by Ardant du Picq suggests the demand for constructs to be synergized with engineering to take to mission success. Clausewitz described war as an instrument of policy by other agencies, which represent the “ terminals ” that represent the stated aim and provides the context. The development and military version of technological discoveries translates to military capablenesss, which serve as the tools or resources that provide the “ agencies ” towards policy “ terminals ” . These capablenesss or ‘tools ‘ may be graduated, runing from full force battalions to single arm systems, depending on context. The employment of constructs through the internal togss of organisation, philosophies and force constructions provides the “ ways ” to interpret the “ agencies ” towards the “ terminals ”[ 21 ].
The ways-means-ends statement is utile in that it demonstrates the inter-relationships between policy, war, constructs, engineering and internal togss, exemplifying the demand for changes in engineering to be accompanied by matching changes in the other elements. Technological discoveries must be militarily adapted, strategized and operationalized through philosophies[ 22 ]and translated to coerce constructions and organisation to be efficaciously employed in the military context to accomplish aims in war and accordingly policy results. In support of this statement, General Shelton, when discoursing transmutation of the military, asserted that progresss in engineering should be accompanied by a focal point on the resources and agencies, operational constructs and the extra component of organisational constructions to utilize these engineerings on the battleground[ 23 ].
Concept reformulation to engineering – Differentiation based on degrees of war
Given the centrality of constructs to military scheme, a true revolution in war-making can merely be achieved if constructs are re-formulated to maximise the operational effects of technological progresss. The elusive hunt for triumph in the battleground basically translates to the uninterrupted hunt for optimisation in scheme, philosophies and tactics, in relation to engineering and operational context. True synergism can merely be achieved if constructs are re-formulated to optimise the possibilities and options brought to the tabular array by engineering. If achieved, such synergy leads to mission success. For exAample, the Blitzkrieg resulted from the combination of the armored combat vehicle, bipartisan wireless, and dive-bomber engineerings, an operaAtional construct that emphasized incursion by armoured forces and a force construction ( the panzer division ) that incorporate armored combat vehicles into specialised divisions.[ 24 ]Carrier air power resulted from the combination of aircraft engineerings to run on bearer decks, operaAtional constructs that allowed bearer aircraft to prosecute the enemy at distance and a force construction ( the bearer undertaking force ) built around the aircraft bearer and its planes.[ 25 ]
It must be qualified, nevertheless, that the demand for reformulation of constructs in response to engineering will depend on the degree of war at which the engineering impacts. For case, engineering that impacts strategic degrees will ask a seismal reformulation of constructs. If nevertheless, technological progresss impact at operational or tactical degrees, it is less likely that a cardinal reformulation of constructs will ensue. Alternatively, such cases can ensue in either a minor alteration to constructs or even a technological improvisation or version of operational and tactical programs by military forces so as to accomplish the coveted results with bing constructs. In such cases, the particular scenario and operational context will order the determination as to whether concept re-formulation or technological improvisation should be effected.
Peoples – critical node between engineering and constructs
The predating subdivision discussed the relationship between engineering and constructs in the war-making procedure. In the concern of war-making, the procedure of passage between engineering and constructs, and frailty versa, requires the engagement of a critical node – people. In any analysis of war and warfare, it is of import to admit the critical function the ‘man-in-the-loop ‘ dramas. Specifically, in the context of this essay, people play a critical function in the interlingual rendition of engineering to constructs and frailty versa. Let me now elaborate on this.
Peoples translate engineering to reformulated constructs. It is of import to acknowledge that the derivation of constructs from new engineerings requires people, specifically military commanding officers, to be able to visualize the possible capablenesss that can be gleaned from a peculiar engineering, and later derive military constructs based on these capablenesss. An illustration of this procedure is the function ACM Dowding played in the pre-WWII in deducing the “ Dowding construct ”[ 26 ]of incorporate air defense mechanism system that tied together radio detection and ranging engineerings, human perceivers ( including the Royal Observer Corps ) , raid plotting and wireless control of aircraft into a web. The airy ability of Dowding was the critical component in interpreting the baby technologies into a construct that proved polar in the success of the British in the Battle of Britain. It is of import to observe that in so making, Dowding had to defy resistance from Churchill but persisted with his pictured construct, showing the criticalness of his engagement. Dowding ‘s resoluteness and continuity to force his construct through finally led Churchill to famously remark “ Never was so much owed by so many to so few ”[ 27 ], mentioning to the important function aviators played in the Battle of Britain.
Peoples translate constructs to drive engineering development and improvisation. Military thought owes its development to a choice group of military minds who coined and articulated theories that fuelled the development of military constructs through clip. Military minds such as Clausewitz, Jomini, Liddell Hart, Douhet, Mitchell, Boyd and Warden are household names in military folklore as their theories and airy thought led to the development of a battalion of war-fighting constructs still relevant today. Military commanding officers wishing to interpret such constructs into schemes and philosophies realize that bing engineerings limits them in using these constructs. The drift for engineering development ( at strategic degree ) and engineering version or improvisation ( at operational and tactical degree ) is therefore born. It is people, specifically, military forces whose uninterrupted hunt for the agencies to use new constructs in hunt of the elusive ‘optimal scheme ‘ to accomplish mission success that is instrumental in driving engineering development in such instances. An illustration may be utile here. Let ‘s take Warden ‘s 5-Ring theory on Centers of Gravity, which provides a model for commanding officers to place marks of strategic involvement to strike at in a peculiar run to weaken the enemy ‘s will to contend. It can be argued that Warden ‘s construct was derived through the merger of Clausewitz ‘s thoughts on war in the strategic kingdom, Jomini ‘s thought on tactics warfare and Douhet ‘s ideas on the efficaciousness of air power. Warden ‘s construct was validated in the Gulf War, where the efficaciousness of air power was utilized to destruct critical communicating nodes that crippled Saddam Hussein and led to U.S triumph. Without the visionary and strategic thought of persons such as Warden, air power engineerings may non hold developed at the same rate to let it to synergistically work features of velocity, range, flexibleness and preciseness in a assortment of functions today.
War-making as a complex system
Figure 1: War-making as a complex system
It is utile to patch things together into a cardinal model. War-making is correspondent to a complex system bing in an operational context influenced by political, economic, societal and technological ( PEST ) factors. Internal togss of force construction and organisation serve as inputs whilst engineering, serves as the boundaries or bounds to the system. The preparation of military scheme is the ‘dynamic procedure ‘ driven by constructs that takes in these inputs and factors in the boundary bounds to determine the character and behavior of war in footings of military scheme, philosophies and tactics ( the end product ) . The influence of people is illustrated through their function in interpreting engineerings to capablenesss and in visualizing constructs from these capablenesss. Such a mold of war-making is utile in that it demonstrates the complex interaction and inter-relationships of the assorted elements with each other. Technology, force construction and organisation interact within the ‘input bed ‘ , each necessitating change in response to the other. The construct preparation procedure can change as a consequence of alterations in boundary bounds due to technological development, through the influence of people, in the construct reformulation procedure. The alteration in constructs is fed back to the input bed for reappraisal, taking to alterations in force construction and organisation. The nature of interaction between engineering and constructs depends upon the extent of alteration of each component ; if engineering progresss are little and impact at operational or tactical degrees, engineering is merely adapted or improvised to fulfill constructs ; if nevertheless the specific engineering progresss are important and impacts at strategic degree, a complete re-think and reformulation of constructs is necessary. All elements nevertheless are besides susceptible to alterations imposed by the contextual political, economic and societal factors.
This essay examined the technological dimension in relation to the behavior of war. The essay began with an geographic expedition of the extent to which the development of engineering through clip has significantly altered the character and behavior of war. The ability of engineering to cross and act upon strategic, operational and tactical degrees of war was so illustrated through appropriate illustrations. The essay so went on to exemplify the relationship between technological discoveries and internal togss of force construction, philosophies and organisation, set uping the demand for these internal togss to concomitantly alter along with engineering. The essay so explored the relationship between constructs and engineering, showing the demand for re-formulation of constructs in response to technological progresss in specific cases. The synergism of the above-named statements leads to the decision that engineering has so been a cardinal enabler in revolutionising the behavior of war. In geting at this decision, it is of import to indicate out that whilst engineering has revolutionized the behavior of war, it has done so in tandem with the development of military idea whilst bing in a larger political, economic and societal context, both of which have had a corresponding influence on the war-making procedure. In add-on, it must besides be admitted that the impact of engineering is ne’er entire, as the fact that that war is by its really nature, a human enterprise – a conflict of volitions imperviable to engineering. This should ne’er be discounted when analyzing war and warfare.