An economic Analysis of the Financial Structure

In an economic system, the fiscal construction is designed promote economic efficiency. One of the chief demands for a healthy economic system is an efficient fiscal system that channel financess from rescuers to investors. ” The fiscal construction of a state includes a complex construction of fiscal system including many different fiscal establishments: Bankss, insurance companies, common financess, stock and bonds markets, etc. which channel the money from the people who save to people with investing chances. ” ( Mishkin 169 )

Basic Facts about Financial Structure

Harmonizing to Mishkin, ” There are eight basic mystifiers that we need to work out in order to

understand how the fiscal system works. “ ( Mishkin 169-172 )

Stockss are non the most of import beginning of external funding for concerns.

Publishing marketable debt and equity securities is non the primary manner in which concerns finance their operations.

Indirect finance, which involves the activities of fiscal mediators, is any times more of import than direct finance, in which concerns raise financess straight from loaners in fiscal markets.

Fiscal mediators, peculiarly Bankss, are the most of import beginning of external financess used to finance concerns.

The fiscal system is among the most to a great extent regulated sectors of the economic system.

Merely big, well-established corporations have easy entree to securities market to finance their activities.

Collateral is a prevailing characteristic of debt contracts for both families and concerns.

Debt contracts typically are highly complicated legal paperss that place significant limitations on the behaviour of the borrower.

Fiscal construction depends on two factors: minutess costs, and information costs.

Transaction Cost

Minutess costs influence fiscal construction. They are major jobs in fiscal markets and are excessively high for ordinary people.

Fiscal intermediaries-help in cut downing dealing costs and let little rescuers and borrowers to profit from the being of fiscal markets. One solution to the job of high dealing costs is to box the financess of many investors together so that they can take advantage of economic systems of graduated table. ( Economies of scale exist because the entire cost of transporting out a dealing in fiscal markets increases merely every bit small as the size of the dealing grows. ) They besides develop expertness to lower minutess costs and supply investors with liquidness services.

Fig.1. A Comparison of dealing cost between assorted states

Beginning: The Financial Express. “ Indian Securities Market Has Lowest Transaction Cost ; Malayan Highest. ” Business News, Finance News, Stock Market, World Business, Financial Markets News Online. N.p. , n.d. Web. 21 July 2010.

In the chart above we can see that the securities market in India has emerged as the lowest cost market among all these states. Harmonizing to a survey by market regulator Securities & A ; Exchange Board of India ( Sebi ) , dealing cost in this market is 40 bits per second. The 2nd lowest cost market is Hong Kong, which has a dealing cost of 43.03 bits per seconds, while the Malayan market with dealing cost at 97.50 bits per second is the highest. Among the other markets where cost of dealing is relatively higher with regard to Indian markets is Thailand ( 60 bits per second ) , USA ( 64.60 bits per second ) , Singapore ( 75.50 bits per second ) and Australia ( 81 bits per second ) . These dealing cost includes assorted constituents like securities firm, regulator ‘s fee, detention charges, uncluttering charges and levies like cast responsibility.

Asymmetrical Information: Adverse Choice and Moral Hazard

Asymmetrical information is a state of affairs that arises when one party ‘s deficient cognition about the other party involved in a dealing makes it impossible to do accurate determinations when carry oning the dealing. The presence of asymmetric information leads to adverse choice and moral jeopardy jobs.

Adverse Choice

Adverse choice is an asymmetric information job that occurs before the dealing. Potential bad recognition hazards are the 1s who most actively seek out loans. Because inauspicious choice increases the opportunities that a loan might be made to a bad recognition hazard, loaners might make up one’s mind non to do any loans, even though there are good recognition hazards in the market place.

Moral Hazard

Moral jeopardy arises after the dealing occurs. The loaner runs the hazard that the borrower will prosecute in activities that are unwanted from the loaners point of position because they make it less likely that the loan will be paid back. Because moral jeopardy lowers the opportunity that the loan will be paid back, loaners may make up one’s mind that they would instead non do loans.

The Lemons Problem: How Adverse Choice Influences Financial Structure

The Lemons Problem arises when investors ca n’t separate between good and bad securities, and are willing to pay lone norm of good and bad securities ‘ value. The consequence is that good securities are undervalued and houses wo n’t publish them ; whereas bad securities overvalued so excessively many are issued. So, Investors wo n’t desire to purchase bad securities, so market wo n’t work good. Harmonizing George Akerlof, “ A Information dissymmetry occurs when the marketer knows more about a merchandise than the purchaser. ”

( Akerlof 3 )

Tools to Help Solve Adverse Selection ( Lemons ) Problems

Methods of riddance of asymmetric information

Private Production and Sale of Information

Supplying the people who supply financess ( loaners ) with full inside informations about the persons or houses seeking to finance their investing activities ( borrowers ) .

Private companies who collect information from the houses ‘ balance sheets and investing activities publish the informations and sell them to endorsers. For illustration: S & A ; P or Moody ‘s

Free-rider job interferes with this solution

The free-rider job occurs when people who do non pay for information return advantage of the information that other people have paid for.

Government Regulation to Increase Information

The authorities regulates the securities market in a manner that encourages houses to uncover honest information about themselves so that the investors can find how good or bad the houses are. For illustration, one-year audits of public corporations.

Fiscal Intermediation

A fiscal intermediary becomes an expert in bring forthing information about houses, so that it can screen out good recognition hazard signifier bad 1s.

Banks can besides avoid free-rider job.

It is doing private loans

Banks are more of import in the fiscal systems of developing states

When the quality of information is better, asymmetric information jobs will be less terrible.

Besides the larger and more established a corporation is, the more likely it will be to publish securities to raise financess.

Collateral and Net Worth

Collateral reduces the effects of inauspicious choice because it reduces the loaners losingss in the event of a default. Lenders are more willing to do loans secured by collateral, and borrowers are willing to provide collateral in order to acquire the loan and at better rate.

Net worth ( equity capital ) , the difference between a house ‘s assets and its liabilities, can execute a similar function to collateral.

How Moral Hazard Affects the Choice between Debt & A ; Equity Contracts

Moral jeopardy is the asymmetric information job that occurs after fiscal dealing takes topographic point, when the marketer of a security may hold inducements to conceal information and engage in activities that are unwanted for the buyer of the security. It has of import effects for whether a house finds it easier to raise financess with debt than with equity contracts.

Moral Hazard in Equity Contracts: The Principal-Agent Problem

The Principal-Agent Problem is the consequence of separation of ownership by shareholders ( principals ) from control by directors ( agents ) . Managers act in ain instead than shareholders ‘ involvement because the directors have less incentive to maximise net incomes than stockholders-owners do. “ The agent is hired to move on behalf of ( and in the best involvements of ) the chief “ ( Silver ) .

Beginning: ( “ WGA update: the not-so-basic economic sciences of industrial action ” )

In the figure above it can be seen how the Principal-agent Problem treats the troubles that arise under conditions of uncomplete andA asymmetric informationA when aA principalA hires anA agent, such as the job of potentialA moral hazardA andA struggle of involvement, in every bit much as the principal is most likely engaging the agent to prosecute its, the principal ‘s, involvements.

Assorted mechanisms may be used to seek to aline the involvements of the agent in coherence with those of the principal, such as piece rates/commissions, A net income sharing, A efficiency rewards, A public presentation measurementA ( includingA fiscal statements ) , the agent posting a bond, or fright of fire. The principal-agent job is found in most employer/employee relationships, for illustration, whenA stakeholdersA hire top executives ofA corporations.

Tools to Help Solve the Principal-Agent Problem

Production of Information: Monitoring

One manner for shareholder to cut down this moral jeopardy job is to supervise the house ‘s activities through different supervising procedure such as scrutinizing and look intoing what the direction is making.

Government Regulation to increase information

Governments have Torahs to coerce houses to adhere to standard accounting rules that make net income confirmation easier. They besides impose stiff condemnable punishments on people who commit the fraud of concealment and stealing net incomes. However, these Torahs and ordinances are non to the full effectual. It is non easy to catch the fraudulent directors because they have inducements to do really difficult for authorities bureaus to happen or turn out fraud.

Fiscal Intermediation

Fiscal intermediation has the ability to avoid the free-rider job in the face of moral jeopardy, and this is another ground why indirect finance is so of import.

Debt Contracts

Debt contract is an understanding whereby the borrower pays the loaner a fixed sum at periodic intervals. Equally long as the loaner receives the in agreement sum, he does non care whether the house is doing net income or enduring a loss.

How Moral Hazard Influences Financial Structure in Debt Markets

Even with the advantages over equity contact, debt contracts are still capable to moral jeopardy. Because a debt contract requires the borrower to pay out a fixed sum and lets him maintain any net incomes above this sum, the borrower has an inducement to take on investing undertakings that are riskier than the loaners would wish. Because of the possible moral jeopardy, loaners may non do the loan to the borrower.

Tools to Help Solve Moral Hazard in Debt Contracts

Net Worth and Collateral

When borrowers have more at interest because their net worth is high or collateral they have pledged to the loaner is valuable, the hazard of moral jeopardy will be reduced.

Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants

Restrictive compacts are directed to cut down moral jeopardy either by governing out unwanted behavior or by promoting desirable behavior.

Fiscal Intermediation:

Banks and other mediators have particular advantages in monitoring. Fiscal intermediaries-particularly banks- have the ability to avoid the free-rider job as the brand chiefly private loans. Private loans are non traded, so no free-rider job exists.


A healthy and vivacious economic system requires a fiscal system that moves financess from people who save to people who have productive investing chances. A proper fiscal system makes certain that the hard-earned nest eggs of people get channeled to productive investors. There are powerful economic constructs that enable us to explicate characteristics of the fiscal system, such as why fiscal contracts are written as they are and that the fiscal mediators are more of import than securities markets for acquiring financess to borrowers. The economic analysis of the fiscal construction besides explains about how fiscal mediators are of import for little investors to put their money and aid in cut downing the dealing costs, these fiscal mediators besides enable little investors to diversify their portfolio and minimize losingss. It besides explains about the hazards involved when borrowers borrow money from assorted markets such as the Debt and Equity markets and besides teaches us the tools and techniques to minimise losingss due to these hazards.